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ABSTRACT
This paper contains a chapter on the general structure of the law from a forthcoming book,
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard University Press, 2003).  In this chapter, I
consider basic features of the legal system, including whether the law directly constrains behavior
or channels it by the threat of sanctions, and whether the law is brought into play by private legal
action or involves public enforcement.  I investigate the conditions under which one or another
structure of law will be socially desirable, and I then discuss tort, contract, criminal law, and several
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THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF LEGAL INTERVENTION 








In this chapter, I will consider the general structure of the law, by which I refer to the answers to 
such questions as the following. Does the law directly constrain behavior, or does the law 
employ the threat of imposition of sanctions to channel behavior?  If sanctions are utilized, are 
they applied whenever behavior is judged undesirable or only when behavior results in harm?  Is 
the law initiated by the legal actions of private parties or does it involve public enforcement? 
These questions are implicitly answered in one way by the law that we observe. Under 
tort and contract law, for example, the legal system is triggered only by the occurrence of harm, 
namely, by a tort or a breach of contract, whereas under criminal law, the legal system comes 
into play and sanctions may be imposed even if harm is not done, notably, when individuals 
commit attempts; and under property law the legal system may intrude before harm is done, such 
as when dangerous behavior is enjoined. Enforcement of tort and contract law is essentially 
private in nature, whereas criminal law is publicly enforced. And so on. 
Such differences in the structure of our major subject areas of law lead us to ask what the 
socially advantageous structure of law might be, in what respects the structure that we observe 
can be rationalized, and in what respects it may deviate from the desirable structure. Below, I 
will examine a relatively simple theory of the determinants of the answers to these questions, and 
I will subsequently consider briefly tort and contract law, safety regulation, the injunction, and 
criminal law in the light of the analysis of optimal general structure of the law.
1 
 
1. Fundamental Dimensions of Legal Intervention 
Here I discuss three primary dimensions of legal methods of controlling behavior and then 
describe major areas of law in terms of these basic dimensions. 
1.1 Time of intervention: before acts, after acts, after harm. The time of legal 
intervention is a primary dimension of a means of controlling behavior. Intervention may occur 
before an act is committed, usually by means of outright prevention of the act. Examples include 
fencing in a reservoir to prevent people from polluting it, denial of authority to operate a nuclear 
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power plant to prevent harm from use of the plant, the exercise of force to stop a person from 
shooting another, and imprisoning an individual to prevent him from committing bad acts. 
    A second time of legal intervention is after an act has been committed but before harm 
occurs (or independently of whether it occurs). Such intervention involves the use of sanctions 
triggered by the commission of acts. If society punishes a person for shooting at another person 
regardless of whether he hits him, it is imposing a sanction based on the commission of the act of 
shooting. Likewise, if society employs a safety regulation requiring that sprinklers be installed in 
a hotel and the hotel operates without them and is fined (regardless of whether a fire occurs), 
society is imposing a sanction based on an act. In neither case, note, is society preventing 
undesirable acts directly; rather, society is attempting to deter the acts by the threat of sanctions 
for committing them. 
The third time of legal intervention is after harm has occurred, by means of harm-based 
sanctions. This is the method of tort law, or of fines based on harm done. Also, in criminal law, 
harm-based sanctions are often imposed (if a person murders someone, he will be punished more 
severely than if he only attempted murder). 
Comment. The model that I have in mind in making the distinctions above is such that a 
party can choose to commit a single act, like shooting a gun at someone. A more detailed model 
would allow for parties to commit multiple acts, such as brandishing a gun and then shooting it. 
In such a model, the description of legal intervention would be more refined; for example, what I 
call prevention in the simple model might correspond to prevention of one type of act (shooting a 
gun) based on a party committing another type of act (brandishing a gun). However, the basic 
thrust of the analysis of such more complex models would not be different from that of the 
analysis below of the simple model. 
1.2 Form of intervention: prevention or sanction (and its type). The form of legal 
intervention may involve a method of preventing an act from occurring, typically through use of 
force (as when a police officer takes a gun away from a person or when a regulatory authority 
locks the doors of a power plant) or physical barriers (as when a reservoir is fenced in to prevent 
intrusions). A second major form of intervention is the imposition of sanctions, notably, of 
monetary sanctions or of imprisonment.
2 
1.3 Privately versus publicly initiated intervention. The use of the legal system may be 
instigated only when a private party asks for that to occur, such as when a person brings a tort 
suit or seeks an injunction; this constitutes private enforcement of law. The legal system may 
also be brought to bear when the state’s enforcement agents determine that it is appropriate, such 
as when police officers or tax collection agents find violations of law and sanction them. (In the 
latter case, the state’s agents may obtain information from private parties who volunteer it, but I 
shall for the most part ignore that point for present purposes.) 
1.4 Methods of legal intervention described in terms of fundamental dimensions. It 
may be helpful to consider a matrix describing certain areas of law and commonly employed 
legal methods of control (the matrix is obviously not intended to be exhaustive) in terms of the 
three dimensions of legal intervention just mentioned.  
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The entry on tort law is self-explanatory. I describe safety regulation as applying both before and 
afer acts occur because sometimes safety regulation functions through preventing certain acts 
from being committed, as when a restaurant is not allowed to open its doors unless it has passed 
a safety inspection, and at other times, regulation works through imposition of sanctions in 
response to a person’s violation of regulation, as when a person is given a ticket for going 
through a stop sign or a restaurant is penalized for failing to clearly mark exits. I also describe 
the form of intervention under regulation as various because, as just mentioned, acts can be 
prevented, and also they can result in sanctions, including nonmonetary ones.   
The injunction is similar to safety regulation in that it can be employed to prevent a 
dangerous act (usually after some prior behavior suggesting danger) or it can be a consequence 
of a potentially or actually dangerous act (as when a person who has ferocious dogs as pets is 
enjoined from keeping them). The main difference from safety regulation is that the injunction is 
brought by private parties. 
Contract law, like tort law, is a method of legal intervention that generally applies only 
after harm is done, when there is a breach of a contractual obligation, and it is private in that 
private actions must be brought for relief. The form of intervention is usually damages for 
breach, 
but may also involve specific performance, which is to say, use of methods, possibly including 
the police powers of the state, to enforce contractual obligations, such as the conveyance of land. 
Criminal law, as indicated in part above, is employed before certain acts occur in order to 
prevent them, as well as after they occur and after harm is done. The form of intervention is not 
only prevention but also includes monetary and nonmonetary sanctions, and enforcement of 
criminal law is public. 
 
2. Optimal Structure of Legal Intervention 
The state has to choose methods of legal intervention to control behavior, and in order to analyze  
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the optimal means of intervention, I will first define the social welfare criterion and then discuss 
the optimal choice of each of the three primary dimensions of the means of intervention. This 
will allow us to organize our thinking about the determinants of the optimal structure of legal 
intervention. 
2.1 Social welfare criterion. The measure of social welfare will for simplicity be taken 
to be the benefits individuals obtain from acts minus the harms done and the costs of 
enforcement of law.
3  These costs include the costs of identifying parties to whom sanctions 
ought to apply, the costs of applying the law, and also the costs of imposing sanctions. When the 
sanctions are monetary, I will generally assume that there is little expense associated with their 
actual imposition. This is motivated by the point that the imposition of monetary sanctions 
amounts to a transfer of purchasing power, not a use of resources (see the discussion in chapters 
20 and 21). When the sanction is imprisonment, I will assume that there is substantial social cost 
associated with its imposition, for imprisonment absorbs social resources. 
2.2 Determinants of the optimal time of intervention. There are several factors that 
bear on the socially optimal time of legal intervention.  
   Information about the character of acts possessed by the state versus information 
possessed by private parties. As a general matter, it appears that the worse is the knowledge 
possessed by the state about the dangerousness of parties’ acts relative to the knowledge of the 
parties themselves, the more attractive will be legal intervention that occurs at later stages. If the 
state knows relatively little about the harmfulness of an act, then sanctions based on the 
occurrence of harm and its magnitude will be appealing, for harm constitutes evidence of 
dangerousness, whereas appropriate sanctions based on acts alone will be difficult for the state to 
determine. If the state does not know how dangerous it is to leave a live wire exposed (because 
the state does not know the likelihood that someone would step on it), a sanction based on harm 
resulting from that act will be more attractive than a sanction based only on commission of the 
act. Likewise, if the state does not know the particular nature of the act a person is likely to 
commit, only its general character, a sanction based on the commission of acts will be more 
attractive than prevention of a whole class of possible acts. If the state does not know whether a 
person will draw his gun and threaten another, it may be best not to prevent the category of acts, 
carrying guns, but only to sanction those persons who commit the act of brandishing their 
weapons in a menacing way.  
If, rather than private parties possessing superior information to the state, it is the state 
that enjoys superior information, then the conclusions just discussed are reversed: Earlier legal 
intervention will become more attractive than later. If the state, but not a person, knows that a 
certain insecticide is carcinogenic, then the state might prefer to prevent its use through 
regulation, because the threat of sanctions based on expected danger from its use or on harm 
caused would tend to be ineffective. Note, though, that an alternative for the state would be for it 
to inform individuals of danger, in which case there would be no reason for early legal 
intervention. However, in some circumstances, communication is not possible or is costly. 
Effectiveness and feasibility of sanctions. The effectiveness of sanctions depends on the 
likelihood that they will be applied and on their feasible magnitude. If sanctions will not be 
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applied with high likelihood because individuals who commit undesirable acts or who cause 
harm cannot easily be identified, sanctions will not be very effective. And if feasible sanctions 
will not be high, as would be the case if they are monetary but a person has little wealth, they 
would again be limited in effectiveness.  
As a general matter, sanctions are disfavored, and prevention of acts is attractive, when 
sanctions are sufficiently lacking in effectiveness. If it would be difficult to catch a person who 
pollutes a reservoir, the best method for controlling this undesirable behavior may be to prevent 
it by fencing in the reservoir. Similarly, use of an injunction may be the best method to control 
the behavior of a firm that could cause large harm by its activities and that possesses little in 
assets, as it would not be deterred much by the threat of a monetary penalty. 
When sanctions increase in effectiveness, act-based and harm-based sanctions may 
become useful. In this regard, note that act-based sanctions do not require that sanctions be as 
high as harm-based sanctions, if the harm due to an act is probabilistic. To illustrate, consider 
money sanctions and the possibility that a person may not be able to pay for harm done, so that 
he would not be adequately deterred by fear of such sanctions for doing large harm. Yet 
sanctioning him for his act may still be effective, for the sanction necessary to deter him may be 
much lower. Suppose that a person’s act would cause harm of 1,000 with probability 10 percent, 
that is, expected harm of 100, and would yield him a benefit of only 50, so that his act is 
undesirable. If society relies on an ex post sanction, imposed only if harm occurs, the person will 
not be deterred unless his assets are at least 500, for 10% H 500 is 50. But if society imposes a 
certain sanction for his act of only 100 -- the expected harm caused by it -- the individual will be 
deterred as long as he has assets of at least 50.  A party needs to have much higher assets to be 
deterred by the threat of sanctions for doing harm than by the threat of sanctions for committing 
an act, if the act causes harm only with a low probability.  
In summary, then, ineffectiveness of sanctions may lead to the desirability of prevention 
over sanctions for acts or for harm, and also to the appeal of act-based over harm-based 
sanctions. 
Administrative cost. There may be substantial variations in the cost society bears if it 
employs different methods of intervention at one or another time. For example, it may be that 
prevention of some types of act is relatively cheap, compared to policing the acts or the harm due 
to them. To stop people from entering a reservoir, all that is needed is a fence; this may be much 
less expensive than stationing police around the reservoir to catch polluters and then imposing 
sanctions. When prevention can be accomplished by use of a physical barrier, whereas 
sanctioning would require monitoring to see when an act or harm is done, prevention may be 
economical. In other circumstances, prevention may be more expensive than the use of 
sanctions. To ensure that people behave correctly when driving, society could place a police 
officer next to the driver inside each car and have the officer stop the driver from making 
improper turns, speeding, and the like. But this prevention of bad driving would be absurdly 
expensive. As a far cheaper alternative, society uses sanctions to penalize bad driving and the 
harm in which it results. 
With regard to act-based versus harm-based sanctions, administrative costs are also 
relevant. Harm-based sanctions have an underlying advantage in that they are applied only with 
a probability, since acts often do not result in harm. This makes harm-based sanctions cheaper, 
other things being equal, although act-based sanctions are sometimes more easily imposed.   
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2.3 Determinants of the optimal form of intervention. With regard to the choice 
between forms of sanctions, what was discussed earlier in chapter 21 applies, namely, that 
sanctions should tend to be employed in the order of their cost. This means that monetary 
sanctions should be employed first, and then imprisonment only after monetary sanctions cannot 
be used because a person’s wealth has been exhausted. (This point was subject to some 
qualifications, such as that monetary sanctions will not serve to achieve incapacitation, but these 
qualifications need not detain us here.)  With regard to the use of sanctions to discourage acts 
versus the prevention of acts, the cost element also comes into play, as just mentioned in section 
2.2, for sanctions may be cheaper than prevention, or the converse. 
2.4 Determinants of the optimality of private versus public enforcement. Whether it 
is advantageous for legal intervention to come about through legal actions brought by private 
parties or through efforts of public enforcement agents depends on which method most 
economically results in the identification and, if necessary, the apprehension, of the parties to 
whom the law should apply. In answering this question, in turn, it is useful to consider whether 
or not private parties naturally hold information about the identity of violators, that is, those to 
whom the law should apply. 
Private parties naturally possess information about the identity of violators. Suppose that 
victims or potential victims of harm from dangerous acts, or perhaps other parties, can identify 
the violators with little or no effort. Then a private role in law enforcement is apparently 
desirable, for it is advantageous for society to harness this information that private parties have 
rather than to spend resources on public enforcement to uncover violations.  
To avail itself of victims’ information, society must provide them with an incentive to 
report their information to social authorities. One way to furnish victims an incentive to report is 
to give them a monetary gain for so doing. Notably, if victims can sue for harm that they sustain, 
as they do under tort and contract law, they will have a motive to report harm that they suffer. 
Another possibility is that victims can be paid rewards by the state, rather than by those who 
injured them. Victims may also be motivated to report violators in order to obtain retributive 
satisfaction, presuming the violators will be sanctioned. Additionally, potential victims may be 
led to report violators in order to avoid future harm, as when a person brings an injunction to 
stop a dangerous activity that could cause him to suffer losses. Through these various means, 
society can induce victims and potential victims to report violations when the victims know the 
identity of the violators. 
In some contexts, private parties other than victims will have information about violators, 
for they will witness violators’ actions, such as when a person observes a hit-and-run automobile 
accident or knows that someone has violated the tax laws. When such parties have information 
about violations, financial incentives to report can be provided, usually rewards of some type. 
However, these parties’ motives to collect may often be less strong than those of victims who 
have suffered loss. Also, these parties are less likely to obtain retributive satisfaction from 
reporting violations than would victims. Additonally, these parties do not usually benefit 
personally from halting an ongoing dangeorous activity, unlike victims and potential victims. 
Consequently, the task of providing incentives to report is, in an approximate sense, more 
difficult when it is parties other than victims and potential victims who possess information 
about violations. 
A possible difficulty connected with payment of money to private parties for reporting  
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violations is that of false assertions of violations, as where a person sues for losses that he did 
not sustain, or an individual illegitimately claims that he observed another person speeding on 
the highway. To combat this problem, the state needs to be able to verify the validity of reported 
violations, and the ability to do this will vary. If a person sues for losses that he did not really 
sustain, it may be fairly easy to determine whether the losses were suffered because normally 
there will be evidence of loss; but if a person is reported to have sped, it is not clear that that can 
be verified. Where the problem of verification is serious, the use of financial incentives to obtain 
reports of infractions will be compromised.
4 
Effort must be expended to identify or to apprehend violators. When the identification or 
apprehension of violators is difficult and requires effort, public enforcement activity by 
enforcement agents may be required. If private parties are unlikely naturally to be able to spot 
and identify violators, such as those who discharge pollutants into a lake or those who speed on 
the highway, then public enforcement effort may be needed to identify them. Even if a private 
party knows the identity of a violator, such as who it was that stole something, it might not be 
easy to locate that person, again possibly calling for public effort. 
This point, that when effort is required to identify or apprehend violators, public 
enforcement agents may be needed, requires amplification and qualification. The main reason is 
that it might be that private parties could be provided with a motive to identify and apprehend 
violators by being paid bounties for so doing. This, however, raises a number of difficulties. One 
is that payment of bounties may engender false accusations (similar to the problem just 
mentioned of false accusations if victims are rewarded for reporting violations). Another 
difficulty is that the incentive of private parties to find violators might be excessive for reasons 
analogous to that why fishing effort is excessive (when one person devotes effort to finding a 
violator, he does not take into account that he lowers the likelihood that others will find them). A 
more general issue is that there are many respects in which efficient effort to identify and 
apprehend violators requires coordination and, sometimes, investment in information systems 
(such as fingerprint records). A different problem with payment of bounties is that the social 
interest might not be served by maximizing bounty income, for the reduction in the number of 
violations is society’s ultimate interest, yet this would reduce bounty income. The import of 
these various problems associated with payment of bounties is that public enforcement may hold 
out advantages over private. Another possible implication is that, if private enforcement is 
desirable, it would probably have to be accomplished by large enterprises, and perhaps by 
regulated monopolies that would be rewarded not only by bounties but also for reducing the 
number of harmful acts. In any case, what is important for us is not so much whether 
enforcement by a public agency is best, but that the enforcement activity must be undertaken by 
a large organization that has the basic characteristics of public enforcement organizations: It has 
a hired corps of enforcement agents, who work in a coordinated way on a large scale to 
apprehend violators, and its interest is not only in penalizing violators but also in deterrence. I 
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will refer to this organization of enforcement as public enforcement for simplicity. 
Conclusion. The above discussion suggests that when private parties themselves, and 
especially victims, can naturally identify violators, private parties will often be desirable to use 
in law enforcement in order to harness their socially valuable information. But when effort is 
required to identify or apprehend violators, it will often be desirable to employ public 
enforcement agents to enforce the law.  
 
3. Optimal Structure of Legal Intervention Illustrated 
I will now illustrate the analysis of the optimal structure of the law by considering important 
areas of legal intervention, and will suggest that the characteristics of the legal regime that we 
observe are rational in an approximate sense. I will also examine the possibility of beneficial 
changes in the overall design of the legal system in the light of the foregoing theory about its 
optimal structure. I should say at the outset that much of the discussion of this section is of a 
frankly conjectural nature, and is motivated mainly by a desire to demonstrate the value of 
analyzing the gross structure of the law from an economic perspective. 
3.1 Tort law. Consider the usual type of tort, such as a car accident, or an injury caused 
when an object falls from a crane at an urban construction site and injures a person walking by.
5  
The question to be addressed is why is it socially advantageous for the behavior giving rise to 
such harms to be controlled by means of a method of legal intervention with the characteristics 
of the tort system, namely, a system that imposes monetary sanctions when harm is done, and 
when private parties sue to collect?   
A speculation about the answer is as follows. First, the use of just monetary sanctions for 
harm leads to reasonably good incentives to reduce harm in the domain of tort, for the identity of 
the responsible party is known to the victim -- this would be often be true in a car accident, or if 
an object is let go by a crane -- and the responsible party often has assets or liability insurance 
coverage sufficient to pay for the harm. This is hardly to deny that incentives may be diluted by 
victims’ inability to determine the authors of harm and by the judgment-proof problem. But these 
problems do not seem to be great enough in the general domain of tort to make resort to 
imprisonment advantageous as a sanction. If society were to imprison individuals for causing 
automobile accidents of the usual tortious nature, for harms caused when objects drop from 
cranes, and for the whole range of torts that we experience, the costs of this much more 
expensive form of sanction would be enormous and essentially unbearable.  
To continue, if society were not usually to limit sanctions in the area of tort to occasions 
when harm occurs, but instead were to penalize potentially harmful acts or attempt to prevent 
them, it would encounter serious informational problems and incur staggering administrative 
costs. Society would have to identify which behavior was really dangerous enough to warrant 
sanctions. Given the great mass of behavior that could result in tortious harms (including the 
millions of daily instances of bad driving, failure to clear sidewalks of ice, and so on), the task of 
sorting out which behavior is dangerous enough to be punished could not be performed well. The 
courts would not know enough to be able to do that; and note that determining whether behavior 
that has not resulted in harm is really dangerous is more difficult than evaluating behavior that 
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has resulted in harm. Moreover, the volume of cases that would have to be considered would be 
a large multiple, plausibly at least a thousand times larger than the volume of torts cases, for the 
simple reason that most dangerous behavior does not actually result in harm. Society saves 
greatly under the tort system because it engages the legal apparatus only in those instances in 
which harm eventuates. 
It remains to say why it makes sense for private parties to have the role that they do under 
the tort system, that is, for sanctions to be imposed only when private parties sue and for the 
parties to collect the sanctions. The explanation is that in the circumstances of the usual tort, the 
victim knows or can readily ascertain the identity of the injurer. When a person is injured in a car 
accident or by an object that falls from a crane, as mentioned above, the victim will usually know 
or be able to learn easily who the injurer was. (Indeed, if this is not the case because the injurer 
attempts to conceal his identity, as in a hit-and-run accident, the injurer’s act may be treated as a 
crime, and thus public enforcement will be employed to raise the likelihood of identifying him.) 
If the victims generally know or can learn the identity of their injurers, then, as I suggested 
above, they can be and will be led to initiate legal intervention by being allowed to collect the 
money sanction. Granting victims the right to sue and collect damages leads to the identification 
of injurers, and importantly, to the supply of information about their behavior that society would 
otherwise not be able to obtain or would have to spend to determine. If the state had to monitor 
the number of automobile accidents and impose fines for harm done, but victims would not 
collect as a consequence, how often would victims report the accidents, testify, and otherwise 
provide information about their harm and about the behavior of injurers?   The private nature of 
the tort system, with the reward of damages paid to victims, allows society to enjoy the benefit of 
the knowledge that victims naturally acquire about the identity and behavior of injurers. 
3.2 Safety regulation. Consider now types of behavior that classically are regulated: use 
of materials and devices influencing fire risks, elevator maintenance, the making and preparation 
of foods and drugs, the building and operation of nuclear reactors, and so forth. Here the 
question at issue is why we should control such behavior by means of regulation, which is to say, 
by prevention and act-based sanctions using public enforcement?
6   
With regard to the fact that the stage of intervention is before harm occurs, I surmise that 
reliance on harm-based sanctions would not be adequate to control much of the behavior under 
discussion. Where safety regulation is employed, it seems that the magnitude of possible harms 
is often large in relation to the assets of the actor. A fire at a movie theatre could kill many 
people, substantially exceeding the assets of the theatre owner; a nuclear power plant accident 
could cause vast harm, injury to tens of thousands of individuals, greatly exceeding the assets of 
its owner; and likewise with contaminated food and its producer or preparer. Moreover, in some 
cases, there would be difficulty in identifying the party who caused harm; the long-term harm 
generated by a nuclear leak might be hard to ascribe to the accident, due to the multiplicity of 
possible causes of certain cancers; food poisoning might be hard to trace to its origin. 
If harm-based sanctions are inadequate to control harm, and prevention and act-based 
sanctions become appealing, society confronts the general problem that it needs to determine 
which behavior is really dangerous. In the areas of safety regulation, it appears that we have 
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attempted to meet this problem by limiting the scope of regulation to those behaviors that we can 
say with fair confidence are undesirable. When regulating fire safety, we concern ourselves with 
such actions as the marking of fire exits and the installation of sprinkler systems, where it is not 
difficult for society to make a judgment about benefits and costs. Normally, society does not 
regulate safety where what is at issue is details of behavior, such as how much wood is stored in 
the basement of a hotel, because it is harder for a regulator to make a sound judgment about 
something like this than about whether there ought to be a sprinkler system in the hotel.  
Society also tends to conserve the administrative costs of act-based intervention and 
prevention by such techniques as focusing on installation of devices that are easy to check (such 
as sprinkler systems) rather than on modifiable behavior (whether barbecue grills are used in a 
safe way), because that would often entail expensive, continuous monitoring; and when behavior 
is regulated, administrative cost savings are sometimes obtained by use of random monitoring.  
Additionally, society sometimes uses methods of prevention of undesirable behavior 
when that is inexpensive. Consider the example mentioned of fencing off a reservoir. Or 
consider the use of a tollgate at the entrance to a tunnel to prevent oversize vehicles or ones 
carrying hazardous materials from entering. In such instances, prevention is cheap, and by its 
nature does not rely on incentives to stop undesirable behavior. 
   The form of sanction employed in safety regulation, when methods of prevention are not 
employed, is often monetary because, as mentioned in section 2.2, act-based sanctions may not 
need to be very high to induce desired behavior. To induce a firm to install fire extinguishers 
costing $1,000, all society need do is impose a certain fine exceeding $1,000; the firm will then 
be led to install the extinguishers as long as its assets are at least $1,000. But if society relied on 
harm-based sanctions to induce the firm to install the extinguishers, the firm might not do that 
because of the judgment-proof problem. When monetary sanctions are not adequate to enforce 
regulations, however, we would expect, and we see, regulations enforced through the threat of 
criminal sanctions. 
Finally, why is regulated activity publicly enforced?  The answer seems mainly to be that 
individuals are often unable to identify dangerous behavior of the types at issue, for several 
reasons. One reason is that a person may not have the expertise necessary to evaluate risk; to 
evaluate the risk of the design and operation of a nuclear power plant, of methods of food 
preparation, of the likelihood that a type of drapery would burn and give off toxic fumes in a fire, 
and so forth, requires knowledge beyond that of the typical individual. A second, independent 
reason is that individuals may not be able to observe the behavior in question; they would not 
ordinarily be admitted into a nuclear power plant, a drug manufacturing facility, or a restaurant’s 
kitchen. Hence, it seems that effort is needed to obtain information about dangerous behavior. 
Thus, for the general reasons furnished in section 2.4 above, public enforcement appears to be 
desirable rather than reliance on private enforcement actions. 
3.3 Injunctions. Individuals bring injunctions for nuisances and clear, continuing threats 
to health or safety. We have to say why, for such behavior, it makes sense for society to make 
use of injunctions, that is, of prevention and act-based intervention that is privately-initiated. As 
with the behaviors controlled by safety regulation, a partial answer for why intervention is 
preventive and/or act-based may lie in the inadequacy of harm-based sanctions. A firm that fails 
to properly maintain a holding pool containing toxic waste might not be able to pay for harm 
done, so that sanctions for harm might not lead it to take ameliorative action, making an  
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injunction a socially desirable method of controlling its behavior.  However, one can imagine 
many circumstances in which parties bring injunctions but in which the judgment-proof problem 
is not clearly at issue, such as injunctions against the making of noise.
7 In any case, it appears 
that the areas of application of injunctions are such that the information the courts possess gives 
them confidence that enjoined activity is undesirable. Indeed, substantial information is provided 
to the courts by the fact that enjoined activity is often of a continuing character, and that it is 
sometimes activity that has produced harm in the past, as when a person has a history of making 
noise or of generating noxious odors. 
That the behaviors at issue should be controlled through privately-initiated legal action, 
rather than through public enforcement effort, is explained by the fact that the types of behavior 
that are usually enjoined are a subset of behaviors that can be observed and recognized as 
dangerous by individuals. There are many types of dangerous activities that individuals will 
come to recognize, such as the presence of vicious dogs, noxious odors, and so forth; virtually by 
definition, nuisances are activities of which we are aware, for they bother us. Individuals are able 
to recognize these acts because of where they occur, because little or no technical knowledge is 
needed to understand the danger they present, and for other reasons. For such activities that 
individuals are able to recognize, society benefits by allowing the individuals to bring 
injunctions to prevent harm; it would be a social waste to have public enforcement agents 
expending effort to find the nuisances and other dangerous conditions that individuals naturally 
recognize themselves.   3.4 Contract law. The nature of contract law is, of course, that 
private parties can bring suit for relief only when harm is done. Why it makes sense to govern 
behavior in contracts by means of harm-based legal intervention is in part that this will generally 
be enough to guarantee socially desirable behavior. Usually the use of ex post sanctions will be 
sufficient to accomplish the purposes of contract law. Indeed, as argued in the chapters on 
contract law, the payment of expectation damages (or whatever the measure is that the parties 
specify) will accomplish the purposes of the parties. The judgment-proof problem will be 
substantially mitigated by the fact that the parties tend to know about each other; if one 
contracting party believes that the other could not pay damages and would not have another 
reason to perform (such as a desire to maintain his reputation), the first party might choose not to 
contract or to take other steps to protect himself (perhaps not rely very much on performance).  
To continue, let me suggest why a system under which the state intervenes in contractual 
relations earlier than when harm is done, earlier than when a breach occurs, would be 
unworkable. The primary reason is that the state does not have enough information to know 
when a party is likely to commit a breach, and breach is often an event that occurs suddenly, for 
instance when a supplier decides to sell to another party, or does not deliver something on time 
because he neglects to ship it on the planned date. Indeed, it requires a real mental effort even to 
conceive of a world in which there is significant legal intervention before breaches of contract 
actually occur.  
Regarding the form of remedy, several points should be made. As noted above, the use of 
money damages for breach is generally beneficial for the parties. This is not only because the 
                                                           
7Here, though, it is possible that tort damages for noise are too low, for doctrinal reasons, effectively rendering 
harm-based sanctions inadequate, in which case it might be said, taking the inadequacy of damages as a constraint, that 
injunction is desirable to control behavior.   
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system of money damages tends to induce performance, but also because it gives those with an 
obligation to perform an escape hatch; it allows them to commit breach when performance is 
very expensive or when highly favorable alternative opportunities present themselves. The 
mutually beneficial nature of the escape hatch provided by breach and payment of money 
damages would not function well if the form of sanction for breach were imprisonment (or 
another costly nonmonetary sanction). For then, when breach occurred, the costs of the sanction 
would be borne, to the detriment of both the parties. (The victim of the breach would not only 
receive no compensation, he would have to pay in the form of a higher price for the anticipated 
losses the party in breach would suffer.) Thus, money damages rather than imprisonment are the 
best form of sanction for breach. It remains to account, though, for the use of specific 
performance as a remedy for breach. As the reader will recall from chapters 15 and 16, specific 
performance is desirable for the parties only in situations in which an escape hatch is not 
mutually advantageous for the parties (typically, for contracts to transfer property, like land, that 
already exists). Thus there is no conflict between what was just said about the undesirability of 
costly nonmonetary sanctions for breach when an escape hatch is mutually desirable and the use 
of specific performance in certain contractual contexts. 
Finally, that it is rational for legal intervention for breach to be privately initiated by the 
victims of breach is virtually self-evident. When individuals make contracts, they know each 
others’ identity, and when one of the parties defaults on his obligation, the other automatically 
knows of it. Hence, society ensures that this information about breach is reported by allowing the 
victim of a breach to collect or to obtain specific performance. It would be a wasteful folly to 
have public enforcement agents attempt to identify those who made contracts and whether they 
were living up to them in a world where victims of breach were not given redress and would not 
be motivated to report breach (except out of irritation or anger). 
3.5 Criminal law.  I now want to explain why the category of acts that we treat as crimes 
-- murder, robbery, theft, and so forth -- are controlled with the nonmonetary sanction of  
imprisonment, whether or not harm is done, and through the use of public enforcement. This 
discussion is relatively brief given the consideration of aspects of this question in section 4 of 
chapter 24. As emphasized there, the use of monetary sanctions alone would be grossly 
inadequate to control the acts in the core area of crime. The types of individuals who commit 
crimes often have little or no assets and are often unlikely to be identified or, at least 
apprehended, by private parties for having done harm. Car thieves, for example, tend to have 
little personal wealth and most instances of car theft do not result in sanctions. If car theft and 
most other acts in the core area of crime were to be punished solely by monetary sanctions, 
deterrence of these acts would be terribly inadequate. 
The problems of achieving deterrence for criminal acts are sufficiently great that society 
cannot rely merely on sanctions for the doing of harm, and will find it desirable to impose 
sanctions when acts are committed that are potentially very harmful even though they do not 
result in harm, or in much harm, in a given instance. This is why it is rational for society to 
punish the whole class of attempts, and also why society punishes acts like carrying certain types 
of concealed weapons. These acts are very harmful in an expected sense, so it may well be 
rational for society to punish them. To restrict sanctions only to acts where a person succeeds in 
doing harm would be undesirable because of the inadequacy of that policy as a deterrent. 
However, society does tend to draw a line and not to punish acts that are not associated with  
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sufficiently large expected harm. Thus, if a person is discovered only at a very early stage of an 
attempt, or if he is found to have only a concealed pocket knife, he might well not face sanctions. 
In such a fashion, society addresses the problem of lack of information about dangerousness, at 
the same time that it augments deterrence by penalizing acts before harm is done if the expected 
harm is large enough.  
That society employs public enforcement agents in the area of criminal behavior is 
chiefly due to the fact that it takes effort to identify and to capture those who commit criminal 
acts. Hence, for the general reasons advanced earlier, it makes sense to use public enforcement 
agents to discover and apprehend criminals. In addition, those who commit criminal acts would 
often retaliate against those who seek to sanction them; this could be problematic for a system 
that depended on private enforcement (and is itself a difficulty for public enforcement when the 
cooperation of witnesses is needed). 
3.6  Joint use of methods of legal intervention. Much behavior is controlled by several 
methods of legal intervention. For example, many harms are controlled both by tort law and 
safety regulation, and most crimes are also torts. At the most general level of explanation, joint 
use of methods of legal intervention would seem socially desirable, for we would expect that 
gaps in the effectiveness of one method of intervention would often usefully be filled by other 
methods of intervention. Let us consider more specifically, although very briefly, the benefits of 
joint use of safety regulation and tort law, and of criminal law and tort law, to demonstrate the 
value of analyzing joint use of methods of control from the perspective of this chapter. 
Safety regulation and tort law. One observes that many harms are controlled both by 
safety regulation and by tort law. For example, harms due to fire are controlled both by 
regulation dealing with such conduct as installation of sprinkler systems and fire exit signs, and 
harms due to fires are also affected by the possibility of suits. What we need to explain is why 
neither safety regulation alone nor tort liability alone is sufficient to control harm due to fire (let 
me focus on this example here).  
The answer as to why it is not advantageous to use the liability system alone is essentially 
what was said to be the reason for use of safety regulation in the first place: that liability may fail 
to deter where parties are judgment proof or would not be identified as the authors of harm. 
Some parties will thus not be deterred by the threat of liability for causing harm (consider a 
restaurant with meager assets), implying that it will be useful to have safety regulation to induce 
or to force these parties at least to install sprinkler systems and fire extinguishers to reduce fire 
risks. Safety regulation, in other words, operates as a kind of backstop to the liability system, 
when that system fails adequately to deter. 
          With regard to the converse question, why is not safety regulation alone used to control 
fire risks, the kernel of the explanation concerns the drawback of safety regulation that was 
emphasized above, that desirable regulation requires government to obtain information that it is 
unlikely to possess for many acts affecting risk. Government may be able to determine that 
certain risk-reducing steps, such as installing sprinkler systems, are worth taking, and may be 
able to monitor them relatively cheaply, but there is much behavior that government cannot 
assess with respect to its social desirability or that it cannot easily regulate. Consider whether 
restaurants keep flammable materials away from stoves, whether oily rags that could catch on 
fire are left in storage closets, and the like. The use of the liability system gives the many actors 
who do have assets sufficient incentive to take such precautions as to remove oily rags and keep  
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flammables in safe places. This is why it is rational for the liability system to be used to 
complement safety regulation, and why compliance with safety regulation is not a general 
defense to liability in a tort action. 
Criminal law and tort law. Most crimes that cause harm are also torts, for which victims 
can collect against injurers, and the question is, why should this be so?  The primary answer 
involves the point that monetary sanctions are less expensive than imprisonment. If society 
determines that a person has committed a crime, then deterrence of this type of act can be 
increased inexpensively, from society’s point of view, by imposing monetary sanctions.
8  Giving 
victims a right to sue in tort is one way of accomplishing the object of augmenting imprisonment 
with monetary sanctions. However, it might be asked why that should be done using the tort 
system rather than solely by imposition of fines. Possible answers are that when victims can 
collect, rather than the state, their incentives to supply information to the state and to cooperate 
in prosecution are enhanced, and that this affords them with compensation if uninsured. In any 
case, the state also has the option to impose fines, and sometimes does so. 
3.7 Possibly beneficial changes in the structure of legal intervention. Although I have 
suggested that important aspects of the gross structure of our system of legal intervention may be 
seen as rational, there are significant benefical changes that could be pursued, and I mention here 
a few possibilities. One is that greater use of financial rewards for those who report on 
infractions of law seems promising; it seems that public enforcement could be aided significantly 
by paying private actors for information. The basis for this suspicion is that private actors, 
especially those working within organizations, often possess information about violations of law; 
and to offer this information, they need to receive significant rewards (so-called whistle-blower 
rewards). Another general avenue for improvement would be to reduce the amount of regulation, 
given that it requires regulators to have more information than they can be expected to possess, 
and to substitute for regulation publicly-imposed sanctions based on harm: namely, fines for 
harm (or fines inflated by the probability of discovery of harm); and corrective taxes for 
expected harm. Although fines are in fact employed, of course, that is done mainly to enforce 
regulatory requirements rather than to impose a bill on injurers equal to harm; and corrective 
taxes for expected harm are rarely used. These methods of intervention offer great advantages 
over regulation because they do not require the state to determine optimal behavior. 
 
4. Remarks: Incompletness of Analysis 
There are several important respects in which the discussion here is incomplete, and I will 
comment briefly on them. The first is that, although I discussed the structure of legal 
intervention, I did not address the closely-related issue of the overall scope of legal intervention: 
that is, which behaviors and conduct are desirable to control legally and which are not. The 
answer to this question depends in part on the social costs associated with legal intervention and 
on extra-legal mechanisms of social control, notably, extra-legal social sanctions associated with 
loss of reputation, and also the internally felt sanctions associated with breach of norms of 
morality. The stronger are these social sanctions and the force of morality, the lesser is the need 
                                                           
     
8Recall the point made in sections 3 and 4 of chapter 21, that it is optimal to impose monetary sanctions equal to wealth 
before imposing imprisonment sanctions.  
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for legal sanctions. These issues will be discussed in part in chapter 27 below. 
A second aspect of incompleteness of the treatment here is that some significant forms of 
legal intervention in our affairs were not noted or barely so. For example, I did not analyze 
corrective taxation, and I did not discuss declaratory actions (such as the granting of marriage 
licenses). 
A third element of incompleteness is that I did not consider the protection of risk-averse 
individuals against risk as a social goal. This was a simplification that I think is sensible to make 
because, as mentioned several times in this book, insurance is widely available on markets, and 
the state can always provide public insurance coverage against a risk if for some reason 
individuals do not purchase it and it is deemed socially desirable. Hence, it does not seem that 
satisfying insurance needs should be an important consideration in the choice of methods of legal 
intervention. 
A fourth element of incompleteness is the omission of income distributional equity as a 
social goal. As with omission of insurance needs, this was a simplification that I believe was 
reasonable to make. The reason, which has been mentioned above and will be amplified in 
chapter 28 below, is that income distributional equity can be pursued directly through the use of 
the income tax and public welfare systems. Thus, altering the design of the legal system proper 
to achieve distributional equity might needlessly compromise achievement of other social goals.  
 
Note on the literature. A number of articles analyze particular issues concerning the 
optimal structure of law from an economic perspective. See in particular Calabresi and Melamed 
(1972) and Kaplow and Shavell (1996b), emphasizing tort law/liability rules versus property 
rules/injunctions; Posner (1985b) and Shavell (1985a) on criminal law and tort law; Shavell 
(1984b,c) on tort law/liability rules versus regulation; and Becker and Stigler (1974), Landes and 
Posner (1975), and Polinsky (1980a) on public versus private enforcement of law. Also, as 
noted, my article Shavell (1993 ) sketches optimal legal design along the lines of this chapter. In 
all, however, the analysis of the structure of law is at an early stage of development.
9 
                                                           
9 See also Polinsky 1980a on tort law/liability rules versus property rules/injunctions; Kolstad, Ulen, and 
Johnson 1990 and Wittman 1977 on liability rules versus regulation;  Baumol and Oates 1988, Kaplow and Shavell 
2002c,  and Weitzman 1974 on corrective taxation versus regulation.  
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